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 NOTE 
Syntax or Experience: What Should 
Determine If Sex Trafficking Qualifies as a 
Crime of Violence? 
United States v. Fuertes, 805 F.3d 485 (4th Cir. 2015), cert. denied sub nom. 
Ventura v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1220 (2016) 
Britteny Pfleger* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The residents of Lebanon, Missouri, a small town in the southern part of 
the state, certainly did not believe their kind, generous neighbors were in fact 
sadistic slave owners.1  Yet such brutality existed, lurking beneath one such 
family’s gentle and caring façade.2  In what was later described as the most 
horrific case of sex trafficking ever prosecuted in the state, a resident couple 
housed a mentally deficient runaway teenage girl with a troubled past and 
forced her to sign a never-ending sex-slave contract.3  “Master Ed” branded 
his victim with a bar code tattoo, marking her as his property, and forced her 
to have sex with him and several “customers.”4  Over the next six years, Mas-
ter Ed subjected the girl to waterboarding, electrocution, and beatings.5  He 
repeatedly threatened his victim with a gun, exhibiting his ability to kill her if 
she did not comply.6  The trafficking was not discovered until 2009, when the 
 
* B.S.B.A. in Business Administration – International Business, University of Mis-
souri, 2014; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of Law, 2017.  I would 
like to thank Professor Mary Beck for her enthusiastic guidance throughout the devel-
opment of this Note.  I would also like to thank Nanette Ward, Education and Survi-
vor Outreach Coordinator for the Central Missouri Stop Human Trafficking Coalition, 
who provided me with extensive research and insight.  A special thank you to my 
mentors in the legal field, Dean Robert Bailey, Mr. Roger Geary, and the Honorable 
Steven C. Montgomery, for their exceptional advice over the years.  Finally, I would 
like to thank my family for their encouragement and unwavering support. 
 1. See Todd C. Frankel, A Missouri Town’s Doubts About a Sex Torture Case, 
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Nov. 5, 2010), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-
and-courts/a-missouri-town-s-doubts-about-a-sex-torture-case/article_03074291-
7988-59e7-9fd1-4d81b5088e56.html. 
 2. See id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Indictment at 9, United States v. Bagley, No. 10-00244-01-CR-W-DW 
(W.D. Mo. Mar. 30, 2011). 
 5. Id. at 7, 12. 
 6. Id. at 13. 
1
Pfleger: Syntax or Experience
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
1216 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
victim went into cardiac arrest after one of Master Ed’s torture sessions, re-
sulting in her hospitalization and emergency treatment.7 
While the circumstances in the Lebanon case were especially horrific, 
the practice of sex trafficking is not unique.  The National Human Trafficking 
Resource Center (“NHTRC”) reported 4136 cases of sex trafficking in the 
United States in 2015,8 including 155 cases in Missouri between 2013 and 
2015.9  To combat these alarming statistics, Congress enacted the Trafficking 
Victims Protection Act (“TVPA”) in 2000 to “ensure just and effective pun-
ishment of traffickers.”10  The TVPA criminalizes the trafficking of people in 
the commercial sex industry by force, fraud, or coercion.11  A conviction un-
der this statute subjects a defendant to a minimum of fifteen years in federal 
prison.12 
Separately, Congress authorized federal prosecutors to charge defend-
ants who possess a gun while committing a “crime of violence” under 18 
U.S.C. § 924(c).13  A conviction under this statute is punishable by at least 
five years, served in addition to the underlying crime of violence.14  To con-
vict a defendant under § 924(c), prosecutors must show (1) the defendant 
possessed or used a gun in the commission of his or her crime and (2) the 
crime committed is characterized as a “crime of violence.”15  Prior to 2015, 
federal courts agreed the sex trafficking of minors was a “crime of vio-
lence.”16  However, in August 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
 
 7. Id. at 19. 
 8. Data Breakdown: United States Report 1/1/2015 – 12/31/2015, NAT’L 
HUMAN TRAFFICKING RESOURCE CTR., 
http://traffickingresourcecenter.org/sites/default/files/NHTRC%202015%20United%2
0States%20Report%20-%20USA%20-%2001.01.15%20-%2012.31.pdf (last visited 
Jan. 15, 2017).  The NHTRC is a national anti-trafficking hotline and resource center.  
Mission, NAT’L HUMAN TRAFFICKING RESOURCE CTR., 
https://traffickingresourcecenter.org/mission (last visited Jan. 15, 2017). 
 9. Missouri, NAT’L HUMAN TRAFFICKING RESOURCE CTR., 
https://traffickingresourcecenter.org/state/missouri (last visited Nov. 8, 2016).  The 
Missouri hotline uncovered fifty-eight cases of sex trafficking and one case of sex and 
labor trafficking in 2015.  Id.  In 2014, thirty-nine cases of sex trafficking and one 
case of sex and labor trafficking were reported.  Id.  In 2013, the NHTRC found fifty-
three cases of sex trafficking and three cases of sex and labor trafficking.  Id.  It is 
important to note these statistics are not cumulative, and each may involve multiple 
victims.  Id. 
 10. 22 U.S.C. § 7101(a) (2012). 
 11. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1591(a) (West 2016). 
 12. Id. § 1591(b)(1). 
 13. Id. § 924(c)(1)(A). 
 14. Id. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). 
 15. Id. § 924(c)(1)(A). 
 16. See infra Part III.B.2. 
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Circuit went against this trend, declaring sex trafficking of an adult victim not 
to be a crime of violence.17 
This Note analyzes the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in United States v. 
Fuertes, ultimately concluding that, contrary to the decision in Fuertes, sex 
trafficking should be considered a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 
924(c).  Part II of this Note details the acts of German Ventura, a defendant 
charged with sex trafficking and possession of a gun during a crime of vio-
lence.  Part III explores the purpose of § 924(c) and courts’ interpretations of 
“crime of violence”; it then considers federal circuit courts’ bases for finding 
sex trafficking under the TVPA to be a violent crime under a variety of stat-
utes.  Part IV summarizes the Fourth Circuit’s decision to depart from estab-
lished precedent.  Part V scrutinizes the court’s theory that sex trafficking 
cannot be a violent crime, ultimately resolving that, while sex trafficking 
should be considered a crime of violence, Congress must change the statute to 
expressly reflect the violent nature of sex trafficking. 
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
By early 2008, German Ventura owned and operated several brothels 
throughout Annapolis, Maryland, quickly becoming a top competitor in the 
commercial sex industry.18  Ventura arranged for prostitutes to work in his 
brothels on a weekly basis.19  The women communicated with Ventura by 
phone, traveled to Washington, D.C., by bus, and were transported by Ventu-
ra or his employees to a brothel.20  Ventura charged customers, commonly 
called johns, thirty dollars for fifteen minutes of sex and paid the women half 
the gross receipts, minus expenses for food, hygiene products, and other trade 
expenses.21 
Ventura had a particularly violent relationship with Rebeca Duenas 
Franco (“Duenas”), who Ventura pimped out to several johns over the course 
of several years.22  Duenas, an undocumented worker with only a third grade 
education,23 was under the control of another pimp when Ventura met her.24  
Ventura extricated Duenas from the pimp’s employment and provided her 
with a place to stay.25  Their relationship became sexual in nature, and Duen-
as subsequently gave birth to Ventura’s son.26  
 17. United States v. Fuertes, 805 F.3d 485, 500 (4th Cir. 2015), cert. denied sub 
nom. Ventura v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1220 (2016). 
 18. See id. at 491. 
 19. Id. at 490. 
 20. Id. at 491. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Brief of Appellee United States of America at 8, United States v. Fuertes, 
805 F.3d 485 (4th Cir. 2015) (Nos. 13-4755(L), 13-4931). 
 24. Fuertes, 805 F.3d at 491. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
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Ventura soon reintroduced Duenas to prostitution by giving her a box of 
condoms and telling Duenas to “go to work.”27  When Duenas resisted, Ven-
tura beat her until she complied.28  While other women received payment for 
their services, Duenas did not.29  Ventura continued to threaten and harm 
Duenas, including beating her with a belt and cutting her foot when she re-
fused to perform sexual acts.30  Through fear and control, Ventura held Du-
enas against her will.31 
Duenas’s fear of Ventura grew as she witnessed other violent acts he 
committed against others.32  Duenas observed Ventura threaten those he per-
ceived as competitors by displaying weapons and making harassing phone 
calls.33  She saw Ventura beat a woman who he believed had sent people to 
rob one of his brothels.34  On another occasion, Duenas watched as Ventura 
assaulted a male employee for threatening to go to the police.35  Perhaps most 
terrifying, Duenas witnessed Ventura celebrating the murder of a competing 
pimp, who he had previously threatened to kill.36  Ventura disclosed to Duen-
as that one of the prostitutes working for the murdered pimp had also been 
killed during the crime.37 
On November 15, 2010, following the serious assault of a competing 
pimp, police arrested Ventura.38  Subsequently, a federal grand jury indicted 
Ventura on charges of conspiracy; transportation of individuals for prostitu-
tion; and sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion.39  In addition, the grand 
 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 492. 
 30. Id. at 491. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Brief of Appellee United States of America, supra note 23, at 16 (“RDF’s 
knowledge of the violence directed at others, whether claimed, actual or threatened, 
was undisputedly relevant evidence because this conduct contributed to a climate of 
fear intentionally created by the defendants to compel RDF to continue to engage in 
commercial sex acts.”). 
 33. Fuertes, 805 F.3d at 492. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Brief of Appellee United States of America, supra note 23, at 24–26. 
 38. Fuertes, 805 F.3d at 492. 
 39. Id. at 493.  The seven-count indictment included charges of (1) “conspiracy 
to transport an individual in interstate commerce for the purpose of prostitution, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371”; (2) “transportation of individuals in interstate com-
merce for the purpose of prostitution, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2421”; and (3) “sex 
trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a).”  Id.  In 
addition, Ventura was individually charged with (1) “coercing or enticing an individ-
ual to travel in interstate commerce for the purpose of prostitution, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 2422(a)”; (2) “transportation of individuals in interstate commerce for the 
purpose of prostitution, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2421”; and (3) “possession and use 
of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence . . . in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).”  
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jury charged Ventura with possession and use of a firearm in relation to a 
crime of violence based on the sex trafficking charge.40 
Proceeding to trial, a jury found Ventura guilty on all counts.41  Denying 
Ventura’s post-trial motions for judgment of acquittal or new trial, the district 
court sentenced Ventura to 420 months’ imprisonment: 360 months for the 
several prostitution and sex trafficking counts and 60 months for the posses-
sion of a gun while committing the crime of sex trafficking.42  On appeal, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the jury’s convictions on 
all counts save one.43  In overturning Ventura’s conviction for possession and 
use of a firearm to commit a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), the 
court found sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion “is not a categorical 
crime of violence.”44 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
In 1968, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) with the intention of pre-
venting criminals from carrying and using firearms during the commission of 
federal felonies.45  To convict a defendant under § 924(c), the court must first 
find the underlying crime to be a “crime of violence” as defined by statute.46  
Courts frequently look to similar provisions containing “crime of violence” or 
“violent crime” language in making this determination.47  While circuit courts 
have not evaluated sex trafficking under § 924(c), courts have evaluated this 
issue under similar “crime of violence” clauses and concluded sex trafficking 
qualifies as a violent crime.48 
A.  Defining Crimes of Violence Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and Similar 
Statutes 
Section 924(c) currently provides a mandatory minimum of five years’ 
imprisonment for “any person who, during and in relation to any crime of 
violence . . . uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such 
 
Id.  This Note analyzes only the possession and use of a firearm in relation to a crime 
of violence under 18 U.S.C. 924(c). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 493, 501. 
 43. Id. at 490. 
 44. Id. 
 45. See United States v. Eagle, 539 F.2d 1166, 1171 (8th Cir. 1976). 
 46. 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A) (2012). 
 47. See infra Part III.A. 
 48. See infra Part III.A. 
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crime, possesses a firearm.”49  A conviction under this statute must be served 
consecutively to the underlying crime.50 
Congress created two distinct definitions under which a felony may 
qualify as a “crime of violence” under § 924(c).51  First, under the “force 
clause,” a felony that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened 
use of physical force against the person or property of another” is a crime of 
violence.52  Second, the “residual clause” expresses that a felony will be con-
sidered a crime of violence if, “by its nature, [the felony] involves a substan-
tial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be 
used in the course of committing the offense.”53  When determining whether 
a crime fits within either “crime of violence” definition, courts commonly 
look at (1) the defendant’s conviction of a particular crime and (2) the “statu-
tory definition of the offense.”54  In most cases, the court cannot consider 
particular facts of a defendant’s case when making the crime of violence de-
termination.55 
Application of this legal principle to § 924(c)’s force clause is straight-
forward: a crime that requires the use, attempt, or threat of force for convic-
tion qualifies as a crime of violence.56  Conversely, when a statute defines a 
felony using elements that “allow[] for both violent and nonviolent means of 
commission, the offense is not a  . . . crime of violence.”57 
The Supreme Court has not defined what constitutes a violent crime un-
der the residual clause of § 924(c).58  Circuit courts have looked to similar 
language in other statutes to evaluate specific crimes, including the criminal 
code’s general definition found in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), the U.S. Sentencing 
 
 49. § 924(c)(1)(A). 
 50. Id. § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii). 
 51. Id. § 924(c)(3). 
 52. Id. § 924(c)(3)(A). 
 53. Id. § 924(c)(3)(B). 
 54. Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2283 (2013) (“Sentencing courts 
may ‘look only to the statutory definitions’ – i.e., the elements – of a defendant’s 
prior offenses, and not ‘to the particular facts underlying those convictions.’” (quoting 
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990))).  The Descamps Court held that if 
a felony statute is indivisible – it does not contain alternative elements – courts must 
apply a categorical approach in making a crime of violence determination.  Id. at 
2281.  On the rare occasion a felony statute contains alternative substantive offenses 
that qualify as a violation, courts will apply a modified categorical approach.  Id. at 
2283. 
 55. Id. at 2283. 
 56. See United States v. Fuertes, 805 F.3d 485, 498 (4th Cir. 2015), cert. denied 
sub nom. Ventura v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1220 (2016). 
 57. Id. 
 58. See Charles Doyle, Federal Mandatory Minimum Sentencing: The 18 U.S.C. 
924(c) Tack-On in Cases Involving Drugs or Violence, CONG. RES. SERV. 3 (Sept. 16, 
2015), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41412.pdf (“The Supreme Court has ad-
dressed several other aspects of § 924(c), but it has yet to decide what constitutes a 
crime of violence for purposes of this section.”). 
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Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.” or “Sentencing Guidelines”) §4B1.2, and the Armed 
Career Criminal Act’s (“ACCA”) definition in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B).59  
However, appellate decisions analyzing felonies as crimes of violence under 
these assorted residual clauses have varied widely.60 
The language in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) parallels that of § 924(c).61  In Leocal 
v. Ashcroft, the Supreme Court asserted that if the felony encompasses a 
“reckless disregard . . . to the risk that the use of physical force against anoth-
er might be required in committing a crime,” it is a crime of violence under § 
16(b).62  In other words, if a person risks having to “use” physical force 
against another person in the course of committing the felony, then it is a 
crime of violence.63 
The Court illustrated its point by analyzing the “classic example” of 
burglary.64  It reasoned that burglary is a crime of violence because it “in-
volves a substantial risk that the burglar will use force against a victim in 
completing the crime,” not because the offense can be committed in a gener-
ally reckless manner.65  By contrast, a conviction for driving under the influ-
ence of alcohol cannot be considered a violent crime because the harm is 
merely accidental or negligent, rather than reckless.66  Yet even after the 
Court’s decision in Leocal, the circuit courts still vary in their crime of vio-
lence determinations.67 
Another prominent residual clause can be found in the Sentencing 
Guidelines.  Under §4B1.1, judges can raise a defendant’s sentencing range 
if: (1) the instant offense is a crime of violence, and (2) the defendant has at 
least two prior felony convictions for either committing a violent crime or 
 
 59. Id. at 4–5. 
 60. Id.  Compare United States v. Hull, 456 F.3d 133, 140 (3d Cir. 2006) (pos-
session of an unregistered pipe bomb was not a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 
16), with United States v. Jennings, 195 F.3d 795, 798 (5th Cir. 1999) (possession of 
a pipe bomb was a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16). 
 61. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) (2012) (defining crime of violence as “any other 
offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical 
force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of commit-
ting the offense”), with § 924(c)(1)(3) (“‘[C]rime of violence’ means an offense that 
is a felony and . . . that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force 
against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the 
offense.”). 
 62. Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 10 (2004). 
 63. Id. at 11 (“In no ‘ordinary or natural’ sense can it be said that a person risks 
having to ‘use’ physical force against another person in the course of operating a 
vehicle while intoxicated and causing injury.”). 
 64. Id. at 10. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 11. 
 67. See generally Hon. Bertha A. Zuniga, Aggravated Felony Case Summary, 
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possessing a controlled substance.68  The Sentencing Guidelines similarly 
provide two definitions for “crimes of violence.”69  While the first definition 
matches that of other “force” clauses, the second definition states a felony 
that “[is a] burglary of a dwelling, arson or extortion, involves use of explo-
sives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of 
physical injury to another” is a “violent felony.”70  Interestingly, the commen-
tary to the Sentencing Guidelines lists, but does not limit itself to, additional 
crimes it considers violent, including: murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, 
forcible sex offenses, robbery, and extortionate extension of credit.71  While 
this provides some guidance as to which crimes apply, circuit courts still vary 
as to unenumerated felonies. 
The ambiguity in applying the “crime of violence” provision carries 
over to the ACCA.  The ACCA almost perfectly mirrors the alternative defi-
nitions of “crime of violence” provided in the Sentencing Guidelines.72  No-
tably, the Supreme Court declared the ACCA’s residual clause to be uncon-
stitutionally vague in 2015 and chastised its own ambiguous interpretations of 
the clause over the past decade.73  The Court in Johnson v. United States felt 
“the residual clause leaves uncertainty about how much risk it takes for a 
crime to qualify as a violent felony” and criticized its application as “judge-
imagined abstraction.”74  While the Court claimed this decision would not 
affect the constitutionality of other residual clauses in nationwide criminal 
codes, several circuits have applied the Johnson holding to other residual 
clauses.75  Because of uncertainty among circuit courts regarding the validity 
of residual clauses, the status of these clauses is now unclear. 
 
 68. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §4B1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
2015).  The Guidelines also indicate the defendant must be eighteen years old at the 
time of conviction.  Id. 
 69. Id. §4B1.2. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. §4B1.2 cmt. n.1. 
 72. Compare §4B1.2, with 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2012). 
 73. Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2560 (2015) (“Nine years’ experi-
ence trying to derive meaning from the residual clause convinces us that we have 
embarked upon a failed enterprise.”).  The Court analyzed its previous holdings in 
James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007); Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 
(2008); Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122 (2009); and Sykes v. United States, 
564 U.S. 1 (2011).  Id. at 2558–60 (“[T]his Court’s repeated attempts and repeated 
failures to craft a principled and objective standard out of the residual clause confirm 
its hopeless indeterminacy.”). 
 74. Id. at 2558. 
 75. See Golicov v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1065, 1072 (10th Cir. 2016) (“Having care-
fully considered these principles and precedents, we agree with the Sixth, Seventh, 
and Ninth Circuits that 18 U.S.C. §16(b) is not meaningfully distinguishable from the 
ACCA’s residual clause and . . . must be deemed unconstitutionally vague in light of 
Johnson.”); Shuti v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 440, 446 (6th Cir. 2016) (“[W]e are convinced 
that Johnson is equally applicable to the [] residual definition of crime of violence. . . 
. [T]his nebulous provision, we conclude, denies due process of law.”); United States 
8
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B.  Sex Trafficking Statutes and Case Law 
Congress passed the TVPA in 2012 “to combat trafficking in persons[,] . 
. . to ensure just and effective punishment of traffickers, and to protect the 
victims.”76  This legislation addressed, for the first time, trafficking in per-
sons as a specific offense, criminalizing participation in sex trafficking by 
force, fraud, or coercion.77  The question of whether a violation of the TVPA 
qualifies as a crime of violence is relatively recent.78  The courts have ad-
dressed this question as to minors, and all concluded criminal sexual activity 
with a minor is categorically a violent crime.79  Prior to Fuertes, no court had 
decided whether criminal sex trafficking of an adult by force, fraud, or coer-
cion qualified as a crime of violence.80 
 
v. Vivas-Ceja, 808 F.3d 719, 723 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Applying Johnson’s reasoning 
here, we conclude that § 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague.”); Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 
F.3d 1110, 1120 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[T]hese uncertainties render [§ 16(b)] unconstitu-
tionally vague.”) (footnote omitted), cert granted, 137 S. Ct. 31 (2016) (mem.).  But 
see United States v. Taylor, 814 F.3d 340, 376 (6th Cir. 2016) (“Johnson does not 
require reversal of Taylor’s conviction, because several factors distinguish the ACCA 
residual clause from § 924(c)(3)(B).”); United States v. Gonzalez-Longoria, 831 F.3d 
670, 677 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (“These distinctions mean that the concerns raised 
by the Court in Johnson with respect to Armed Career Criminal Act’s residual clause 
do not cause the same problems in the context of 18 U.S.C. § 16(b). . . . Thus, we 
hold that 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) is not unconstitutionally vague on its face.”).  In addition, 
the Eighth Circuit has asked the attorneys in United States v. Taylor to brief whether 
the Court’s holding in Johnson makes U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 unconstitutionally vague.  
United States v. Taylor, 803 F.3d 931, 932 (8th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). 
 76. 22 U.S.C. § 7101(a) (2012). 
 77. Mohamed Y. Mattar, Interpreting Judicial Interpretations of the Criminal 
Statutes of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act: Ten Years Later, 19 AM. U. J. 
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 1247, 1250 (2011) (“The TVPA of 2000 recognized for the 
first time trafficking in persons as a specific offense.”).  The statute also recognized 
forced labor, trafficking with respect to peonage, slavery, involuntary servitude, un-
lawful conduct with respect to documents, and attempting to commit any of these acts 
as crimes under the TVPA.  Id. 
 78. Id. at 1249. 
 79. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 529 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2008) (“[I]t is 
surpassingly difficult to see how burglary could be treated as a violent crime yet child 
trafficking exempted.”); United States v. Patterson, 576 F.3d 431, 442 (7th Cir. 2009) 
(“[T]he government is correct that violation of the statute creates a significant risk of 
violence against the victim by the perpetrator . . . .”); United States v. Keelan, 786 
F.3d 865, 872 (11th Cir. 2015) (“Since the conduct encompassed by the elements of § 
2422(b) involves a sex crime against a minor, the ordinary or generic violation of § 
2422(b) involves a substantial risk the defendant may use physical force in the course 
of committing the offense.”). 
 80. See Brief of Appellee United States of America, supra note 23, at 38–40 
(comparing the reasons circuits have found sex trafficking of minors to be a crime of 
violence with the physical risk of injury to adult victims). 
9
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1.  The Prosecution of Sex Traffickers: Developing Statutory Law 
The TVPA recognizes human trafficking as “a contemporary manifesta-
tion of slavery.”81  In 2000, Congress estimated 50,000 women and children 
were trafficked into the United States.82  In the congressional findings, legis-
lators noted that traffickers target impoverished women and girls who lack 
access to education and economic opportunities.83  Trafficked women and 
girls “are often forced through physical violence to engage in sex acts,” in-
cluding rape and other forms of sexual abuse, torture, starvation, and impris-
onment.84  Traffickers threaten their victims, claiming they will physically 
harm the victims or others should the victims attempt to escape.85  According-
ly, Congress declared, “Trafficking includes all the elements of the crime of 
forcible rape when it involves the involuntary participation of another person 
in sex acts by means of fraud, force, or coercion.”86 
The TVPA defines sex trafficking as the use of force, fraud, or coer-
cion,87 or any combination thereof, to cause a person to engage in a commer-
cial sex act.88  As prescribed by statute, a “commercial sex act” is “any sex 
act, on account of which anything of value is given to or received by any 
person.”89  Prohibited sex acts, such as the recruitment, enticement, providing 
or benefiting from commercial sex trafficking, are punishable by no less than 
fifteen years in prison.90 
Prior to the TVPA, the only statute to prosecute sex traffickers fell under 
the Mann Act.91  The Mann Act, originally passed in 1910, currently makes it 
a felony to knowingly transport a person with the intent that person engage 
“in any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal 
offense.”92  Specifically, the Mann Act criminalizes the persuasion, induce-
 
 81. § 7101(a). 
 82. Id. § 7101(b)(1). 
 83. Id. § 7101(b)(4). 
 84. Id. § 7101(b)(6). 
 85. Id. § 7101(b)(7). 
 86. Id. § 7101(b)(9). 
 87. Coercion is defined as (1) “threats of serious harm to or physical restraint 
against any person”; (2) “any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause a person to 
believe that failure to perform an act would result in serious harm to or physical re-
straint against any person”; or (3) “the abuse or threatened abuse of law or the legal 
process.”  18 U.S.C.A. § 1591(e)(2) (West 2016). 
 88. As indicated by statute, “force fraud and coercion are not separate elements 
of the offense of sex trafficking” but are “alternate means to accomplish a single ele-
ment.”  See Mattar, supra note 77, at 1265 (quoting United States v. Paris, No. 03:06-
cr-64 (CFD), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78418, at *36 (D. Conn. 2007)). 
 89. § 1591(e)(3). 
 90. Id. § 1591(b)(1). 
 91. See Mattar, supra note 77, at 1250. 
 92. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2421(a); id. § 2422(a); see also Mattar, supra note 77, at 
1250–52. 
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ment, enticement, and coercion of said individuals, allowing the government 
to prosecute sex traffickers.93  Interestingly, the Mann Act does not require 
proof of force, fraud, or coercion, effectively lowering the burden of proof on 
the government.94 
2.  Sex Trafficking as a Crime of Violence in Circuit Courts 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit was the first court to ad-
dress whether the sex trafficking of minors through interstate commerce con-
stituted a violent crime for the purpose of categorizing the defendant as a 
career offender.95  Over a two-year period, the defendant in United States v. 
Williams caused a thirteen-year-old girl to travel from Massachusetts to 
neighboring states to perform sex acts for money.96  The defendant argued his 
conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a), transportation of a minor with intent to 
engage in sexual activity, could not be considered a crime of violence be-
cause the defendant was not charged with personal sexual contact with the 
girl.97  The First Circuit disagreed, claiming, “[I]t is common ground that 
most ‘indecent sexual contact crimes perpetrated by adults against children 
categorically present a serious potential risk of physical injury.’”98  The court 
reasoned that most illicit sexual activity between an adult and a minor occurs 
in close quarters and is perpetuated by an adult upon a “smaller, weaker, and 
less experienced” minor.99  The court concluded, “The fact that the appellant 
was not personally intimate with the minor . . . does nothing to diminish the 
risk that force might be used in carrying out the crime” because the defend-
ant’s conduct “necessarily placed the minor in harm’s way.”100 
Perhaps most similar to Fuertes, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit decided in United States v. Willoughby that a conviction of sex traf-
ficking of a minor under 18 U.S.C. § 1591 qualified as a “crime of violence” 
 
 93. § 2422(a) (“Whoever knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any 
individual to travel in interstate or foreign commerce, . . . to engage in prostitution, or 
any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense . . . 
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.”). 
 94. See Mattar, supra note 77, at 1251. 
 95. United States v. Williams, 529 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2008). 
 96. Id. at 3. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 5 (quoting United States v. Cadieux, 500 F.3d 37, 45 (1st Cir. 2007)). 
 99. Id. (quoting United States v. Sherwood, 156 F.3d 219, 221 (1st Cir. 1998)). 
 100. Id.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit addressed the same 
question a year later in United States v. Patterson.  576 F.3d 431, 434 (7th Cir. 2009).  
Following the court in Williams, the court found a crime committed under § 2423(a) 
created “a significant risk of violence against the victim by the perpetrator as well as 
third parties.”  Id. at 442.  Though the crime does require an element of violence, the 
court found the crime presented a sufficiently substantial risk to qualify under the 
ACCA’s residual clause.  Id. 
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for a career criminal sentencing.101  In that case, the defendant took in a six-
teen-year-old runaway girl and proceeded to have sex with her and sell her to 
other johns.102  Terrified of and completely dependent on the defendant, the 
girl felt she had no choice but to comply.103 
The court held, “[T]he act of causing a minor to engage in prostitution – 
even when the defendant’s act does itself not involve force – obviously does 
present a ‘serious potential risk of physical injury’ to the victim.”104  The 
court acknowledged the risk of physical injury from the act itself, including 
violence from johns and the pimp.105  The constant risk of physical violence 
loomed regardless of whether the pimp actually used force to cause the victim 
to engage in sex because “there is always a serious risk he will use force af-
terward, if she disobeys his rules, fails to obtain a client, or for any number of 
reasons.” 106 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit followed similar rea-
soning when finding the transportation of a minor in violation of the Mann 
Act to be a crime of violence for purposes of the Mandatory Victims Restitu-
tion Act (“MVRA”).107  In United States v. Keelan, the defendant developed a 
sexual relationship with one of his high school students over the course of 
two years.108  When the defendant moved to Virginia to take a new teaching 
job, he continued his relationship with the former student until the child gave 
the defendant up to the police.109  A jury convicted the defendant of knowing-
ly persuading, inducing, or enticing a minor to engage in sexual activity.110 
In seeking to apply the MVRA, the federal prosecutor had to prove the 
defendant committed a crime of violence that resulted in bodily injury, look-
ing to § 16(b) to determine whether the offense was a crime of violence.111  
The court, evaluating the ordinary violation of the statute, proclaimed a sub-
stantial risk of physical force always exists in order to ensure a child’s com-
pliance.112  The court surmised that the defendant therefore committed a 
crime of violence under § 16(b)’s residual clause and ordered the defendant to 
pay restitution.113 
 
 101. 742 F.3d 229, 242 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 102. Id. at 232. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 242 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §4B1.2(a)(2) 
(U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015)). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. United States v. Keelan, 786 F.3d 865, 872–73 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 108. Id. at 868. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 870. 
 111. Id. at 871–72. 
 112. Id. at 872. 
 113. Id. 
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With courts unanimously declaring sex trafficking of minors to be a 
crime of violence under a variety of statutes, it seems logical to similarly 
qualify the sex trafficking of adults.  However, the Fourth Circuit disagreed. 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
In United States v. Fuertes, the Fourth Circuit unanimously concluded 
sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion could not be a crime of violence 
for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 942(c).114  In doing so, the court found the sex 
trafficking statute did not conform to the force clause or the residual 
clause.115  The court reversed Ventura’s conviction for possessing a gun dur-
ing a crime of violence, reducing Ventura’s sentence by five years.116 
The Fuentes court first evaluated whether sex trafficking by force, 
fraud, or coercion qualified categorically as a crime of violence under § 
924(c)’s force clause.117  Citing Descamps v. United States, the court asserted 
a crime could not be a crime of violence if the statute’s elements allow for 
both violent and nonviolent commissions of the crime.118  The court reasoned 
because 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) specifically allows for sex trafficking to be 
committed by fraud alone, it can be committed non-violently.119  Therefore, 
the court concluded sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion does not qual-
ify as a categorical crime of violence under the force clause.120 
Next, the court addressed whether the crime of sex trafficking by force, 
fraud, or coercion qualified as a crime of violence under § 924(c)’s residual 
clause.121  The government argued that even when the defendant commits the 
crime of sex trafficking by fraud alone, victims still face a substantial risk of 
injury from customers.122  The court rejected this analysis.123  Relying on the 
statute’s language, the court reasoned the proper inquiry was not whether 
there was a risk any person tangentially related to the offense would use 
force.124  Rather, the court must inquire whether the defendant presented such 
a substantial risk.125 
 
 114. United States v. Fuertes, 805 F.3d 485, 501 (4th Cir. 2015), cert. denied sub 
nom. Ventura v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1220 (2016). 
 115. See id. at 499–500. 
 116. Id. at 501 (“Ventura cannot be guilty of violating § 924(c), and yet he re-
ceived an additional sixty months’ imprisonment for this offense.”). 
 117. Id. at 498–99. 
 118. Id. at 498. 
 119. Id. at 499. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 500. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 499. 
 125. Id. 
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The court illustrated its point by examining burglary as a crime of vio-
lence.126  Employing Leocal v. Ashcroft, the court surmised burglary would 
be covered as a crime of violence because there was a significant risk the 
burglar would use force in completing the crime.127  Comparing this conclu-
sion to the opposite outcome reached in Willoughby, the court explained the 
Sentencing Guidelines, also used in Leocal, involved broader language than 
18 U.S.C. § 16(b).128  Specifically, U.S.S.G. §4B1.2 “involves conduct that 
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another,” while 18 
U.S.C. § 16(b) limits the risk to only “during the course of committing the 
offense.”129  Finding the district court plainly erred in instructing the jury that 
sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion is a violent crime, the Fourth Cir-
cuit vacated Ventura’s § 924(c) conviction.130 
V.  COMMENT 
The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Fuertes exemplifies the common mis-
perceptions prosecutors face when prosecuting sex traffickers.131  First, this 
Part will address these misperceptions by looking at how traffickers use a mix 
of physical violence, coercion, deception, and vulnerability to pressure their 
victims into commercial sex.132  Next, this Part will consider the “substantial 
risk of violence” analysis in Fuertes under a corrected sex trafficking lens, 
concluding sex trafficking is a violent crime under the residual clause.  This 
Part then explores the future of sex trafficking as a violent crime given the 
residual clause’s uncertain future in statutory law, ultimately resolving that 
Congress must qualify a conviction of sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coer-
cion as forcible rape in the criminal statute.133 
 
 126. Id. at 500. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 501. 
 131. See Dorchen A. Leidholdt, Human Trafficking and Domestic Violence: A 
Primer for Judges, 52 JUDGES’ J. 16 (2013).  See also TASK FORCE ON TRAFFICKING 
OF WOMEN & GIRLS, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON TRAFFICKING OF WOMEN AND 
GIRLS 26 (2014), https://www.apa.org/pi/women/programs/trafficking/report.pdf 
[hereinafter REPORT]. 
 132. See Janice G. Raymond & Donna M. Hughes, Sex Trafficking of Women in 
the United States: International and Domestic Trends, DOJ 57–65 (Apr. 17, 2001), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/187774.pdf. 
 133. While sex traffickers victimize both men and women, this Part focuses on 
female sex trafficking reports and statistics for simplicity and easy reading.  Any 
pronouns will therefore refer to “her” throughout this Part. 
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A.  What Is Sex Trafficking? Violence, Manipulation, and Dependence 
Sex trafficking is infamously recognized as the most common form of 
modern-day slavery.134  It is the third largest and fastest-growing criminal 
enterprise in the world,135 victimizing an estimated four and a half million 
people globally.136  Traffickers operating in the United States frequently op-
erate in solo or small-group operations, capable of running multi-state traf-
ficking businesses and grossing into the millions of dollars.137 
Violence is an intrinsic part of human sex trafficking.138  Traffickers use 
physical force to initiate women into the world of commercial sex.139  They 
then use violence to punish, threaten, intimidate, dominate, control, and iso-
late the victim.140  Traffickers will also use violence as a mechanism to obtain 
their own sexual gratification.141 
A 2001 study funded by the U.S. Department of Justice interviewed 
domestic and international victims of sex trafficking and found “violence, 
rape, robbery, kidnapping, and killings are normal occurrences for women in 
prostitution.”142  The same study reported that 86% of the American women 
interviewed and 53% of the international women interviewed experienced 
physical abuse at the hands of their traffickers.143  These women experienced 
violence such as “having [their] head and face split open, being punched until 
[their] teeth were knocked out, pounded unconscious, hit with hangers, 
choked, and pushed out of moving cars.”144  Traffickers often used weapons, 
including guns, knives, sticks, and ropes.145  Importantly, these numbers are 
consistently underreported and underestimated.146 
Traffickers often rape their victims in order to ensure their compli-
ance.147  Studies show between one-third and two-thirds of trafficked women 
 
 134. Amanda Walker-Rodriguez & Rodney Hill, Human Sex Trafficking, FBI 
(Mar. 2011), https://leb.fbi.gov/2011/march/human-sex-trafficking (last visited Feb. 
3, 2017). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Sex Trafficking, POLARIS PROJECT, https://polarisproject.org/sex-trafficking 
(last visited Jan. 15, 2017). 
 137. See Raymond & Hughes, supra note 132, at 20. 
 138. Id. at 9. 
 139. Id. at 55. 
 140. Id. at 60–61. 
 141. Id. at 61. 
 142. Id. at 66. 
 143. Id. at 65. 
 144. Id. at 58–59. 
 145. Id. at 59. 
 146. Id. at 74.  The researchers list several reasons why these numbers are in reali-
ty higher than statistics reflect, including: (1) “[n]ormalizing the violence in their 
lives,” (2) “[r]eluctance to describe or speak about the violence for fear of retaliation 
from the abuser,” and (3) “[s]hame in talking about what they were subjected to.”  Id. 
 147. See Leidholdt, supra note 131, at 16. 
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reported being raped by traffickers and their clients.148  One such study, fund-
ed by the Department of Justice, revealed that 80% of the domestically traf-
ficked interviewees, and almost 40% of the international interviewees, report-
ed sexual assault at the hands of their traffickers.149  The FBI also recognized 
that traffickers sometimes use gang rape as a means of gaining control over 
their victims.150  Similar to reports of physical violence, sexual violence is 
underreported in these studies.151 
Researchers from another study followed almost 2000 sexually exploit-
ed women for thirty years.152  The study revealed that homicide was the lead-
ing cause of premature death.153  The rate of homicide for these women was 
seven times higher than male taxicab drivers and fifty-one times higher than 
the homicide rate for female liquor store workers (the two occupations with 
the highest homicide rates in the country at the time of the study).154  The 
study noted, “[N]o population of women studied previously has had a crude 
mortality rate, standardized mortality ratio, or percentage of deaths due to 
murder even approximating those observed in our cohort.”155 
Traffickers also frequently threaten violence against the victim or her 
family in order to gain compliance.  In one study, 90% of American women 
and 47% of international women reported verbal threats made by traffick-
ers.156  In addition, both American and international women received threats 
to their families.157  Victims see these threats as viable because traffickers 
often belong to the same community as the victim and her loved ones.158  
This type of coercion places victims in constant fear of danger. 
Psychological coercion is a form of mental violence.159  Traffickers 
readily admit to using this type of coercion as a method to maintain control of 
their victims.160  A trafficker’s most effective method of recruitment is estab-
 
 148. See REPORT, supra note 131, at 37 (citing Melissa Farley et al., Prostitution 
and Trafficking in Nine Countries: An Update on Violence and Posttraumatic Stress 
Disorder, 2 J. TRAUMA PRAC. 33 (2003)). 
 149. See Raymond & Hughes, supra note 132, at 9. 
 150. Walker-Rodriguez & Hill, supra note 134. 
 151. See Raymond & Hughes, supra note 132, at 74. 
 152. REPORT, supra note 131, at 37 (citing John J. Potterat et al., Mortality in a 
Long-Term Open Cohort of Prostitute Women, 159 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 778, 783 
(2004)). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. (quoting Potterat et al., supra note 152, at 783). 
 156. Raymond & Hughes, supra note 132, at 9. 
 157. Id. at 62. 
 158. Leidholdt, supra note 131, at 16. 
 159. REPORT, supra note 131, at 35. 
 160. Meredith Dank et al., Estimating the Size and Structure of the Underground 
Commercial Sex Economy in Eight Major US Cities, URBAN INST. 2 (Mar. 2014), 
http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/413047-Estimating-
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lishing a relationship of trust with potential victims – he falsely promises 
marriage, family, and love.161  After the victim becomes dependent on the 
perpetrator, he then manipulates her into the commercial sex trade, using 
methods such as locking her in a room, forcing her to witness violence perpe-
trated on others, depriving her of movement, and emotionally abusing, sham-
ing, or neglecting her as a means to intimidate and punish.162  Victims report 
their traffickers control the money the victims earn; victims become depend-
ent on the traffickers’ support for food, clothes, and shelter.163  These meth-
ods become tantamount to torture for the women involved.164 
The common lack of understanding of how psychological coercion 
augments physical violence presents significant obstacles for prosecutors.165  
Misperceptions by judges and juries that the victim was complicit in her vic-
timization, or at the very least failed to leave her trafficker, persuade factfind-
ers that the defendant did not commit a crime.166  Rather than recognizing 
victims of sex trafficking, courts will chastise victims for their sexual exploi-
tations, often sending them back into the clutches of their traffickers.167  It is 
this same lack of understanding that led the Fourth Circuit to its uninformed 
decision in Fuertes. 
B.  Sex Trafficking as a Violent Crime Under the Residual Clause 
The Fuertes court concluded sex trafficking did not present a substantial 
risk of physical violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).168  The court refused to 
apply other circuit courts’ analyses of sex trafficking statutes to the instant 
case.169  While the court emphasized that the decision relied on the defend-
ant’s conduct in the ordinary case of sex trafficking, it failed to investigate 
such statistics.170  An analysis of both other circuits’ decisions and crime sta-




 161. Walker-Rodriguez & Hill, supra note 134. 
 162. REPORT, supra note 131, at 36. 
 163. Raymond & Hughes, supra note 132, at 51, 58. 
 164. REPORT, supra note 131, at 36. 
 165. Id. at 26. 
 166. Id. at 36. 
 167. See Leidholdt, supra note 131, at 16. 
 168. United States v. Fuertes, 805 F.3d 485, 499–501 (4th Cir. 2015), cert. denied 
sub nom. Ventura v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1220 (2016). 
 169. See id. at 500. 
 170. See id. 
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1.  The Substantial Risk of Violence at the Hands of Johns: The Circuit 
Courts’ Imputation of the Easily Foreseen Risk to the Trafficker 
The First Circuit in Williams found an imbalance of power between the 
adult and child because a child is smaller, weaker, and less experienced; these 
characteristics inherently lead to the use of force.171  The same power imbal-
ance can also be found in a majority of adult sex trafficking cases.  Traffick-
ers, by nature, target vulnerable persons.172  Women and girls with few eco-
nomic opportunities, struggling to meet basic needs, make easy prey for traf-
fickers.173  Perpetrators look for specific indicators when finding victims, 
such as poverty, young age, limited education, lack of work opportunities, 
lack of family support, history of sexual abuse, and health and mental chal-
lenges.174 
One study found 73% of trafficked international women had very little 
to no English language skills.175  The same study found the majority of both 
domestic and international female victims entered the sex industry before the 
age of twenty-five, many of them as children.176  It is clear the power imbal-
ance is not just found in sex trafficking of minors but also in sex trafficking 
generally.177  As such, the Fuertes court should have recognized the inherent 
risk of physical violence that accompanies such asymmetric power. 
The First Circuit’s finding of an imbalance of power in child sex traf-
ficking cases led to its conclusion that sex trafficking of a minor is a crime of 
violence, in part because the trafficker “necessarily placed the minor in 
harm’s way and led ineluctably to a sex act . . . between the minor and an 
older man unconcerned with her welfare.”178  The Sixth Circuit in Willoughby 
mirrored this conclusion, finding a § 1591 conviction is a crime of violence 
because of the risk of physical injury from johns.179 
The government argued the same reasoning applied in Williams and 
Willoughby should also apply to the sex trafficking of adults, but the Fourth 
 
 171. United States v. Williams, 529 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting United 
States v. Sherwood, 156 F.3d 219, 221 (1st Cir. 1998)). 
 172. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT 
SECRETARY FOR PLAN. & EVALUATION, HUMAN TRAFFICKING INTO AND WITHIN THE 
UNITED STATES: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 10 (Aug. 30, 2009), 
aspe.hhs.gov/report/human-trafficking-and-within-united-states-review-literature  
[hereinafter HUMAN TRAFFICKING INTO AND WITHIN]. 
 173. Id. at 7. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Raymond & Hughes, supra note 132, at 7. 
 176. Id. 
 177. HUMAN TRAFFICKING INTO AND WITHIN, supra note 172, at 7–11. 
 178. United States v. Williams, 529 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2008). 
 179. United States v. Willoughby, 742 F.3d 229, 242 (6th Cir. 2014). 
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Circuit rejected this position.180  The Fourth Circuit claimed the U.S.S.G. 
§4B1.2 residual clause at issue in Willoughby was more expansive than the 
residual clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B); while §4B1.2 simply requires 
“conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another,” 
the court reasoned § 924(c) asks “whether there is a substantial risk that the 
defendant will use physical force against the victim in completing the 
crime.”181 
Interestingly, the Eleventh Circuit in Keelan found differently; it reject-
ed the defendant’s argument that § 16(b), the same language used in § 924(c), 
was narrower than §4B1.2.182  Prior to Keelan, the court had deduced that 
there was no “substantial difference that requires a different decision between 
the definition of a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16 . . . and the defini-
tion of a crime of violence for career offender purposes under [U.S.S.G. 
§4B1.2].”183  In keeping with this conclusion, the court found sex trafficking 
of a minor to be a violent crime under both §4B1.2 and § 16(b).184  Seen from 
this interpretation, the Willoughby court’s conclusion that a claim for sex 
trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion is a crime of violence under §4B1.2 
should also apply to crime of violence clauses in § 16(b) and § 924(c).185 
The Fourth Circuit attempted to dissuade legal readers from accepting 
this argument by considering Keelan in a footnote.186  The court claimed Kee-
lan applies only to child sex crimes and is therefore inapplicable to the instant 
case.187  Yet the statute used to convict the defendant in Keelan does not con-
tain any element of physical force.188  Instead, the statute requires the gov-
ernment to prove the defendant knowingly “persuade[d], induce[d], entice[d], 
or coerce[d]” a minor to engage in sexual activity.189  Undeterred, the Keelan 
court held substantial risk of physical force will always exist when a child 
complies with an adult’s sexual demands.190  Conversely, despite the statute’s 
 
 180. United States v. Fuertes, 805 F.3d 485, 500 (4th Cir. 2015), cert. denied sub 
nom. Ventura v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1220 (2016); Brief of Appellee United 
States of America, supra note 23, at 39. 
 181. Id. at 499–500. 
 182. United States v. Keelan, 786 F.3d 865, 870–72 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 183. United States v. Rutherford, 175 F.3d 899, 905 (11th Cir. 1999).  See also 
United States v. Searcy, 418 F.3d 1193, 1197 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[A] crime of violence 
determination for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 16 is indistinguishable from a determi-
nation made pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1.”). 
 184. Keelan, 786 F.3d at 870, 872. 
 185. This conclusion is supported by recent circuit courts’ statements.  See supra 
Part III.A (residual clauses in § 16(b) and U.S.S.G. §4K1.2 are unconstitutionally 
vague after the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Johnson). 
 186. Fuertes, 805 F.3d at 500 n.6. 
 187. Id. 
 188. See id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (2012). 
 189. § 2422(b). 
 190. United States v. Keelan, 786 F.3d 865, 871 (11th Cir. 2015). 
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express listing of force and threats of force as possible elements, the Fourth 
Circuit declined to accept Keelan’s reasoning.191 
The Fourth Circuit viewed the adult-minor distinction as dispositive, 
yet, as mentioned earlier, adult victims are similarly subjected to the imbal-
anced power dynamic that is seen in child sex trafficking.192  Moreover, force 
is a specific element of the statute for adult sex trafficking.193  The court’s 
view that adult sex trafficking cannot be a violent crime because the defend-
ant merely places the victim in harmful situations and does not harm the vic-
tims directly is contrary to both prior holdings on sex trafficking and the in-
terpretations of various residual clauses.194 
2.  Substantial Risk of Violence by the Trafficker Himself 
The Fourth Circuit emphasized the relevant question in Fuertes was 
whether there was a substantial risk the defendant would use physical force 
against the victim in a sex trafficking crime.195  The court relied on the exam-
ple in Leocal v. Ashcroft, which reasoned, “burglary, by its nature, involves a 
substantial risk that the burglar will use force against a victim in completing 
the crime.”196  While the Fourth Circuit considered the risk of physical vio-
lence at the hands of a trafficker’s clientele, it failed to analyze the potential 
for physical harm at the hands of the trafficker himself. 
Analyzing the established violent crime of burglary under the “substan-
tial risk of physical force” standard is illuminating.  Traditionally, burglary is 
considered to be a property crime against another, defined as “a breaking and 
entering of a dwelling house of another at night with the intent to commit a 
felony therein.”197  Yet burglary has long been considered a crime of violence 
by the federal court system.198  It has been proffered, “Perhaps it is the fact 
that other crimes might occur after a burglar enters a building, and that those 
crimes might be violent, that has resulted in the categorization of burglary as 
a violent offense when the law requires that criminal record be used for sen-
tencing enhancement.”199 
Yet a 2015 analysis of burglaries occurring between 1998 and 2007 re-
vealed that fewer than 8% resulted in physical violence or threats of physical 
 
 191. Fuertes, 805 F.3d at 500 n.6. 
 192. Id. at 496. 
 193. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1591(a) (West 2016). 
 194. Fuertes, 805 F.3d at 500. 
 195. Id. at 499–500. 
 196. Id. at 500 (quoting Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 10 (2004)). 
 197. Richard F. Culp, Phillip M. Kopp & Candace McCoy, Is Burglary a Crime of 
Violence?  An Analysis of National Data 1998–2007, NAT’L CRIM. JUST. REFERENCE 
SERV. 2 (Feb. 2015), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/248651.pdf (quoting 
Burglary, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)). 
 198. Id. at 3. 
 199. Id. at viii–ix. 
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violence.200  The highest estimate of actual violence occurring during burgla-
ries, as indicated by physical injuries to a victim, was only 2.7%.201  Striking-
ly, courts have found that even if a victim did not know a burglar entered the 
building until after the property was discovered missing, the burglary is still a 
violent crime due to the risk of violence.202  It is reasonable to conclude from 
these statistics that a “substantial risk of violence” for residual clause purpos-
es is a relatively low threshold.203 
When comparing the potential for physical harm between burglary and 
sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion, empirical data show a tremendous 
difference between the rates of violence.204  Studies typically find between 80 
and 90% of sex trafficking victims experience violence at the hands of their 
traffickers.205  One study concluded up to 90% of women received verbal 
threats of violence from their traffickers.206  Compared to these numbers, the 
risk of physical violence in a burglary is quite paltry.  Despite these statistics, 
the Fourth Circuit found the risk of violence by a burglar to be sufficient for a 
crime of violence determination and failed to even consider the risk of vio-
lence by a sex trafficker to his victim.207  Instead, the court dismissed the 
argument in a footnote.208 
Unlike the Fourth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit adjudged sex trafficking by 
force, fraud, or coercion to fulfill the residual clause definition for a crime of 
violence.209  The Willoughby court specifically pointed to the risk of violence 
from the pimp “regardless of whether the pimp use[d] force to cause his vic-
tim to engage in a sex act.”210  The Sixth Circuit acknowledged what the em-
pirical data prove: “[T]here is always a serious risk that [the pimp] will use 
force afterward, if she disobeys his rules, fails to obtain a client, or for any 
number of reasons.”211  This is in keeping with other circuits, which have 
found sex trafficking of a minor involves risks of physical harm to be suffi-
 
 200. Id. at x.  This number represents burglaries in urban areas.  Id. at ii.  For rural 
areas, the likelihood for violence and threats of violence is less than 1%.  Id. 
 201. Id. at ii. 
 202. Id. at viii. 
 203. Id. at ii.  Researchers agree, surmising it is “clear that the majority of burgla-
ries do not involve physical violence and scarcely even present the possibility of 
physical violence.”  Id. 
 204. Id.  Raymond & Hughes, supra note 132, at 9. 
 205. Raymond & Hughes, supra note 132, at 9. 
 206. Id. 
 207. See United States v. Fuertes, 805 F.3d 485, 500 n.6 (4th Cir. 2015) (“[W]e 
are not persuaded that the ordinary case of sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion 
involves a substantial risk that the defendant will use physical force as a means to 
commit the offense.”), cert. denied sub nom. Ventura v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 
1220 (2016). 
 208. See id. 
 209. United States v. Willoughby, 742 F.3d 229, 242 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
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cient for purposes of a crime of violence.212  The Fourth Circuit’s opinion is 
inconsistent with reliable data and contrary to the thoughtful interpretations 
of other courts. 
Due to the Fourth Circuit’s ruling in Fuertes, prosecutors are not likely 
to bring 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) claims, instead using the Sentencing Guidelines 
to further the goal of reducing guns in the commission of violent crimes.213  
One possible option in the Fuertes case would be to ask for a sentencing en-
hancement under U.S.S.G. §2K2.1, which raises a defendant’s sentencing 
range if a defendant used, possessed, or transported a firearm.214  While most 
sentencing enhancements under this guideline require a conviction under § 
924(c), a prosecutor can bring a sentencing enhancement under §2K2.1(a)(5), 
as it simply requires the instant offense to involve a firearm.215 
This strategy has its limitations.  Section 2K2.1(a)(5) restricts the appli-
cation of the Sentencing Guidelines only to specific guns outlined in 26 
U.S.C. § 5845(a).216  The types of guns found in this section include sawed-
off shotguns and modified rifles, machine guns, and explosives.217  It also 
includes “any weapon or device capable of being concealed on the person 
from which a shot can be discharged.”218  The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
and Firearms lists devices such as pen guns, cigarette lighter guns, knife guns, 
can guns, and umbrella guns.219  This definition also includes pistols and re-
volvers having smooth bore barrels.220  In other words, § 5845 only applies to 
illegal guns and excludes many types of guns people are allowed to purchase 
for use at home or hunting.221  The possibility for the prosecutor to obtain a 
sentencing enhancement through §2K2.1 therefore fails to capture all crimi-
nals, including sex traffickers, who use legally obtained guns.  The best way  
 212. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 529 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2008) (“[I]t is 
surpassingly difficult to see how burglary could be treated as a violent crime yet child 
trafficking exempted.”); United States v. Patterson, 576 F.3d 431, 442 (7th Cir. 2009) 
(“[T]he government is correct that violation of the statute creates a significant risk of 
violence against the victim by the perpetrator . . . .”); United States v. Keelan, 786 
F.3d 865, 872 (11th Cir. 2015) (“Since the conduct encompassed by the elements of § 
2422(b) involves a sex crime against a minor, the ordinary or generic violation of § 
2422(b) involves a substantial risk the defendant may use physical force in the course 
of committing the offense.”). 
 213. Telephone Interview with Teresa Moore, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. At-
torney’s Office, Western District of Missouri (Feb. 8, 2016). 
 214. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §2K2.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
2014). 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id.; 26 U.S.C. § 5845(e) (2012). 
 219. What Are “Firearms” Under the NFA?, BUREAU ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, & 
FIREARMS § 2.1.5, at 7, https://www.atf.gov/file/58196/download (last visited Jan. 15, 
2017). 
 220. Id. 
 221. § 5845. 
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to effectively punish a defendant for the possession or use of a gun in a sex 
trafficking crime is to proceed under the residual clause of § 924(c). 
It is difficult to fathom how the court could consider burglary, with sta-
tistically low rates of violence, to be a violent crime, while disqualifying sex 
trafficking as a violent crime, when so many trafficked victims face violence 
at the hands of their traffickers.  Similarly, the court’s conclusion – that traf-
fickers are not responsible for the harm committed against their victims when 
they use their superior power to place vulnerable women at risk – is nonsen-
sical.  This decision is illustrative of the general factfinders’ lack of education 
on this issue.  The best approach for prosecutors is not to find alternative 
methods to effectively punish sex traffickers, but rather to educate factfinders 
on the power dynamics and methods of control used by traffickers, including 
the common use of force and threat of force as a means of domination. 
Because sex trafficking victims face substantial odds of violence, sex 
trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion should be considered a crime of vio-
lence under the several residual clauses.  However, what happens if the sever-
al residual clauses are found to be unconstitutionally vague and stricken from 
statutes? 
C.  Thinking Ahead: Can Congress Ensure Sex Trafficking Is Consid-
ered a Violent Crime? 
Even if the Fourth Circuit had found committing sex trafficking by 
force, fraud, or coercion to be a crime of violence under the residual clause, 
the circuit courts’ holdings since United States v. Johnson would call into 
question the instant decision’s constitutionality.  While § 924(c)’s residual 
clause has yet to be found in violation of due process, circuit courts have de-
clared its sister clause, § 16(b), to be unconstitutionally vague.222  The gov-
ernment may be precluded from using § 924(c)’s residual clause in the future, 
requiring the prosecutor to satisfy § 924(c)’s force clause. 
Unfortunately, sex trafficking cannot qualify as a crime of violence un-
der 924(c)’s force clause.  The elements of the sex trafficking statute require 
the crime to be committed by force, fraud, or coercion.  Thus, in theory, the 
crime could be committed by fraudulent means alone, making the statute 
applicable to both non-violent and violent instances.  The broad interpreta-
tions of this statute, while helpful when convicting sex traffickers, make it 
difficult to fit sex trafficking within the force clause.223  As currently con-
structed, the statute leaves prosecutors unable to charge sex trafficking de-
fendants under § 924(c), evading the effective justice espoused by the TVPA. 
However, an informed analysis of sex trafficking as a violent crime re-
quires a closer look into the congressional findings under the TVPA.  Under 
this statute, Congress declared, “Trafficking includes all elements of the 
 
 222. See supra note 75 (listing the various circuit courts’ decisions on the consti-
tutionality of residual clauses). 
 223. See Telephone Interview with Teresa Moore, supra note 213. 
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crime of forcible rape when it involves the involuntary participation of an-
other person in sex acts by means of fraud, force, or coercion.”224  Forcible 
rape automatically includes the necessary requirement to qualify as a crime of 
violence: force or threat of force.225  Because a finding of force, fraud, or 
coercion qualifies as forcible rape, a conviction of sex trafficking should be 
considered a crime of violence, regardless of which elements were proven in 
the actual conviction.  While the government presented such an argument, the 
court did not address it in the published opinion.226  In oral argument, the 
court was reluctant to allow the TVPA’s “legislative history” to inform its 
interpretation of crime of violence.227 
The idea that congressional findings are simply “legislative history” 
minimizes the legitimate purpose they serve.228  The government argued as 
much, asserting that the findings in the TVPA were “enacted text that satis-
fied the bicameralism and presentment requirements of [the U.S. Constitu-
tion], and thus have the force of law.”229  The U.S. Supreme Court agreed 
with this interpretation, claiming congressional findings to be “part of the 
statute.”230  Congress creates its findings to “inform” the court’s interpreta-
tion, and the court’s decision must be “in harmony” with such findings.231  
Any other interpretation would clearly violate the TVPA’s stated purpose to 
“ensure just and effective punishment of [sex] traffickers.”232 
Nevertheless, circuit courts may continue to diminish the importance of 
Congress’s TVPA findings.  Congress must clarify its intention to hold sex 
trafficking as a violent crime.  The best possible solution is to insert language 
into the criminal sex trafficking statute that equates sex trafficking by force, 
fraud, or coercion to forcible rape.  This addition to the statute seems to align 
with the original intent of the legislature; the application of the same terms in 
the criminal and congressional statute make clear the legislature meant to 
equate a conviction of sex trafficking under § 1591 with forcible rape.233  By 
 
 224. 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(9) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 225. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 580 (7th ed. 2015) 
(“The traditional rule is that a successful prosecution for forcible rape requires proof 
that the female did not consent to the intercourse and that the sexual intercourse was 
secured by force.”). 
 226. Supplemental Brief Filed August 3, 2015, at 1, United States v. Fuertes, 805 
F.3d 485 (Nos. 13-4755(L), 13-4816), 2015 WL 4638635.  See generally, United 
States v. Fuertes, 805 F.3d 485 (4th Cir. 2015), cert. denied sub nom. Ventura v. 
United States, 136 S. Ct. 1220 (2016). 
 227. Supplemental Brief Filed August 3, 2015, supra note 226 at 1. 
 228. Id. at 2. 
 229. Id. at 1. 
 230. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 45 (1989). 
 231. Supplemental Brief Filed August 3, 2015, supra note 227, at 2 (citing Dig. 
Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 879 (1994)). 
 232. 22 U.S.C. § 7101(a) (2012). 
 233. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (“The ‘normal rule of 
statutory construction’ [is] that ‘identical words used in different parts of the same act 
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expressly placing the language in the statute, courts would more likely find 
that sex trafficking qualifies as a categorical crime of violence under the force 
clause. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri, “Master 
Ed” of Lebanon, Missouri, pled guilty to his eleven-count indictment, includ-
ing a charge for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of vio-
lence.234  The federal judge sentenced Edward Bagley to twenty years’ im-
prisonment.235  However, the recent Fourth Circuit decision in United States 
v. Fuertes is a strong deterrent for federal prosecutors around the country, 
likely preventing them from additionally charging sex traffickers under 18 
U.S.C. § 924(c).  Instead of a twenty-year sentence, traffickers like Bagley 
would receive a fifteen-year sentence.  This is not the outcome Congress in-
tended when it wrote the TVPA and is contrary to its stated purpose of com-
batting trafficking and protecting victims.236 
The Fourth Circuit’s decision reflects the lack of education general fact-
finders receive about the violence and manipulation wielded by traffickers.  
Studies show both traffickers and their clients expose their victims to a sub-
stantial risk of violence.237  While the Fourth Circuit’s judgment that, contra-
ry to data, sex trafficking does not present a substantial risk of violence is 
inappropriate, it may carry insignificant weight in the future due to the ques-
tionable constitutionality of the residual clause.  As such, the best solution is 
for Congress to directly insert in the criminal statute what it already explicitly 
states in the TVPA’s findings: sex trafficking includes all elements of forcible 
rape.  Only then will traffickers be ensured just and effective punishment.   
 
are intended to have the same meaning.’” (quoting Dep’t of Revenue v. ACF Indus., 
Inc., 510 U.S. 332, 342 (1994))).  See also United States v. Shell, 789 F.3d 335, 357–
58 (4th Cir. 2015) (“‘[F]orcible sex offenses’ is a distinct term with a consistent 
meaning across §§ 2L1.2 and 4B1.2.”). 
 234. Lebanon Man Guilty, Faces 20 Years in Prison for Coercing a Minor to 
Become a Sex Slave, DOJ (Jan. 15, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/usao-
wdmo/pr/human-traficking-rescue-project-0. 
 235. Lebanon Man Sentenced to 20 Years for Coercing a Minor to Become a Sex 
Slave, FBI (Sept. 11, 2013), https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/kansascity/press-
releases/2013/lebanon-man-sentenced-to-20-years-for-coercing-a-minor-to-become-a-
sex-slave. 
 236. § 7101(a). 
 237. Raymond & Hughes, supra note 132, at 9. 
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